美国能源统治:2017年特朗普政策下的市场外文翻译资料

 2022-11-21 16:57:53

U.S. Energy Dominance: Markets Trump Policy In 2017

By Anna Mikulska and Michael Maher

U.S. President Donald Trump, center, speaks during the Unleashing American Energy event at the Department of Energy in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Thursday, June 29, 2017. Trump said he is lifting an Obama-era policy that curtailed the financing of coal-fired power plants overseas, as he seeks to reorient the U.S. government away from fighting climate change and toward American 'energy dominance.'

Over the last year President Trump has repeatedly emphasized his commitment to making America a dominant player in the world energy markets. This rhetoric has underpinned a set of policies designed to deregulate and encourage oil and gas activity. But a quick look into the nature of those policies and current energy markets reveals a more complex story, one where the 2017 growth in U.S. oil and gas industry is tied to market forces and already existing liberal trade policies that ended the ban on U.S. crude exports and expedited LNG exports. This is consistent with our expectations in early 2016 .We also expect this trend to continue with energy-focused policies introduced by this administration playing a supporting but tertiary role to markets and state-level policies. At the same time, we see policies related to tax and trade as more impactful forces that can have a more immediate effect on U.S. oil and gas industry.

The first year of Trump presidency has been marked by an expanding oil and gas sector. But the rise in production (Figures 1) reflected rebounding crude prices, rather than changes in policy ($43.30 in 2016 vs. at $50.70 per bbl in 2017 for WTI and $2.51 vs. nearly $3.00 per Million Btu for gas), as well as increased global demand, and cutbacks in production by Russia and OPEC.

Data Source: EIA

U.S. companies took advantage of these market conditions thanks to the previous administrationrsquo;s actions that initiated the export of U.S. crude and propelled the construction of LNG export terminals. Together with continuing growth in well productivity and reduction in drilling costs these factors also contributed to a more profitable US upstream.

Based on the most recent data virtually all of the growth in oil and gas production in the recent years has come from non-federal lands. Thus, one should not expect changes in federal lands policy introduced in 2017 to have had a measureable impact on growth in oil and gas production.

To be sure, several policy initiatives employed by the Trump administration can and will likely impact the oil and gas industry, including 1) the administrationrsquo;s decisive push to back out of climate policies, such as the Paris agreement and the Clean Power Plan (CPP) (which would have benefited natural gas vs. coal); 2) rolling back environmental regulations such as the methane rule (which would have raised oil/gas development costs), and fracking regulations on federal lands (which could have slowed permitting on those lands); and 3) offering increased onshore and offshore federal gas acreage for leasing coupled with a speedier permitting process.

However, the impact of these policies will not be immediate and will be muted by social and market forces. A careful look reveals why.

To start, federal policy constitutes only one of many factors impacting energy development. Market forces and state and local policy will most likely impact effectiveness of federal rules.

Take coal for example. The administration pushed decisively for saving this sector as it stepped away from the Paris agreement and abandoned the CPP. Yet, approximately 4.5 GW coal capacity that was retired in 2017, only 1 GW short of the 5.5 GW the EIA projected at the end of 2016. The coal power plants retired in 2017 were also on average 10 years younger than those retired in 2016, which suggests operators are pessimistic about their coal assetsrsquo; competitiveness going forward. The closings are strongly related to the inexpensive, abundant U.S. natural gas, expansion in renewable generation, and a continued push by many states and municipalities for cleaner energy sources. Even at the federal level, the plan by DOE Secretary Rick Perry to prop up uneconomic coal (and nuclear) energy generation was rejected by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

In effect, in 2017 the dialing back of federal-level emissions reduction policies failed to revive the coal sector , though it may slow down the rate at which coal is supplanted by natural gas and renewables. Also, prospects for new coal-fired power plants do not seem promising. As of January 2018 no new coal-fired facilities are listed as planned in the U.S. Perhaps not surprising since the life span of any new power sector investments extends well beyond even a two-term Trump presidency. Individual states and companies are wary of being left with power facilities whose economic lives are cut short if policies re-focus on cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Similar logic has been fuelling the voluntary efforts to cut back on methane emissions, despite the administrationrsquo;s push that scraps federal regulations. This includes an internationally focused agreement between BP, Eni, ExxonMobil, Repsol, Shell, Statoil, Total, and Wintershall and the U.S.–centric Environmental Partnership lead by the American Petroleum Institute and joined by 26 U.S. oil and gas companies. To be sure, these companies are also responding to market factors and possible economic benefits from preventing waste of methane via leaks or certain drilling practices . But whether driven by environmental concerns or profit considerations, companies seem to recognize the need for regulatory action with respect to methane emissions . ExxonMobil, for example, even suggests a template for methane emissions regulations designed to support technological innovation while not excessively increasing compl

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美国能源统治:2017年特朗普政策下的市场

作者:Anna Mikulska、Michael Maher

美国总统唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)于美国时间2017年6月29日星期四在华盛顿能源部(Department of Energy)举行的美国能源大会上发表讲话。特朗普这样说,他正在取消奥巴马执政时期的能源政策,这一政策限制了海外燃煤电厂的融资,而他正试图让美国政府从过去对抗气候变化的能源战略思路转变为使美国拥有“能源主导地位”的局面上来。

在过去的一年中,特朗普总统一再强调他致力于使美国成为世界能源市场的主导者。在这种言论下,他支持了目的在于放松能源生产限制和鼓励石油和天然气开发活动的一系列政策。但通过迅速地查看这些政策和当前能源市场的性质,我们可以发现一个更复杂多变的局势,其中美国石油和天然气行业2017年的增长与市场力量以及已经存在的自由贸易政策紧密联系在了一起,这些政策终止了美国原油出口的禁令并加快液化天然气的出口。这与我们在2016年初的预期一致。我们也预计这一趋势将继续,本届特朗普政府推出的以能源为重点的政策在市场和国家层面的政策中扮演支持性的第三位角色。与此同时,我们认为与税收和贸易相关的政策是更具影响力的力量,可能会对美国石油和天然气行业产生更为直接的影响。

特朗普担任总统职位的第一年就出台政策促使石油和天然气部门的扩张。在此条件下,2017年美国原油及天然气产量的确比2016年提高了不少(图1),但产量的上升主要是国际原油价格的反弹的结果,并不是特朗普政策下导致的变化(2016年为43.30美元,2017年为WTI每桶50.70美元,2.51美元,而天然气为每百万英热单位近3.00美元),2017年全球能源的需求增加,但俄罗斯和欧佩克等主要产油国却减小了本国的油气产量,这就使国际原油价格发生反弹。

图一 2016年与2017年美国原油和天然气产量对比

数据来源:国际能源情报署(EIA)

美国能源公司充分利用了这些有利的市场条件,这得益于前政府采取行动启动了美国原油出口并推动了液化天然气出口码头建设的项目。再加上油井生产力的持续增长和钻井成本的降低,这些因素共同促成了美国上游利润增加。

根据最近的数据显示,近几年基本上所有的石油和天然气生产增长都来自于非联邦土地。因此,虽然特朗普许可可以将联邦土地租赁给能源开发商,但不应该过多的指望2017年实施的联邦土地政策变化会对石油和天然气生产的增长产生十分可观的积极影响。

可以肯定的是,特朗普政府采取的几项政策举措能够而且可能会对石油和天然气行业产生影响,包括1)政府决定性地推动退出气候政策,如巴黎协议和清洁电力计划(CPP),这将有利于天然气与煤炭行业的发展; 2)重新审视环境法规,例如甲烷法(这会提高石油/天然气开发成本)和联邦土地上的压裂法规(这可能会减缓这些土地上的许可证); 3)为租赁提供更多的陆上和海上联邦燃气面积,同时加快相关产业的行政审批流程。

然而,这些政策所产生的影响将不会立即地显现出来,而且它们还会受到社会和市场力量的影响。仔细一看可以发现其中的原因所在。

首先,联邦政策只是影响能源发展的众多因素之一。市场力量以及州和地方政策很可能会影响联邦规则的有效性。

以煤炭为例。当特朗普政府决定脱离巴黎协议并放弃CPP时,政府果断地推销这一领域的相关部门。然而,2017年关闭的煤炭产能约为4.5吉瓦,仅相当于2016年底预计的5.5吉瓦。2017年关闭的煤电厂它们存在的平均寿命比2016年关闭的煤电厂还要年轻10%。这表明运营商们对煤炭资产未来的竞争力感到悲观。这些低效能煤炭电厂的关闭,美国天然气的大量生产开发,可再生能源发电的扩张与许多州和市政府对清洁能源的持续的大力推动是息息相关的。即使在联邦层面,美国能源部长瑞克佩里计划支持不经济的煤(和核能)发电的计划也被联邦能源管理委员会(FERC)拒绝了回来。

实际上,2017年联邦层面减排政策的回拨并没有能使煤炭行业真正的复苏起来,但是它可能会减缓天然气和可再生能源替代煤炭的速度。此外,新燃煤电厂的前景似乎并不乐观。截至2018年1月,没有新的燃煤设施按计划在美国上市。但这也许并不奇怪,因为任何新的电力部门投资的寿命都远远超过了两届特朗普总统的任期。如果未来政府政策的重点放在减少温室气体排放上,个别州和公司都担心被迫停止使用经济寿命缩短的电力设施。

尽管美国政府在清洁能源方面推动削减联邦对其支持的法规,但运用类似的逻辑,许多公司对减少甲烷排放量做出了自愿的努力。这其中包括BP,埃尼,埃克森美孚,雷普索尔,壳牌,挪威国家石油公司,道达尔和温特斯豪尔以及由美国石油协会牵头的以美国为中心的环境合作伙伴关系,并由26家美国石油和天然气公司加入。可以肯定的是,这些公司也在回应市场因素和通过泄漏或某些钻井实践防止甲烷浪费的可能的经济效益。但无论是出于环境问题还是利润考虑,企业似乎都认识到需要采取有关甲烷排放的监管行动。例如,埃克森美孚甚至提出了旨在支持技术创新的甲烷排放法规模板,同时不会过度增加合规成本负担。

从长期因素进行分析考虑,能源成本下降和全球需求市场的扩大也将会对扩大的联邦土地和海上(墨西哥湾以外)租赁机会可能产生的影响。美国加利福尼亚等州的高成本,诉讼风险,环境反对和反发展行动将增加西部和东部海岸相关土地租赁的风险和审批延误的可能性。这些因素也可能会削弱一些成本效益,因为行政部门提出的较为繁琐的许可流程可能会给此类行业带来负面影响。

从投资的方向分析,富含碳氢化合物的私人土地(如二叠盆地,巴肯和马塞勒)的竞争在许可和环境反对,虽说不是投资的主要障碍,但也可能会降低新近提供的联邦境内土地的投资率。特别是在阿拉斯加,恶劣的气候和环境问题可能会挑战任何潜在的投资者,尤其是在目前的价格环境下。同时,潜在的海外租赁将不得不与美国以外的机会竞争,包括在邻国墨西哥提供充足的产品。去年8月在美国举行的首场GOM拍卖会似乎证实了这些挑战,因为出价少于所提供的面积的7%。

因此,增加的能源开发面积是否能够恢复美国联邦区域内的美国石油和天然气总产量下降趋势(2015年为21%,2006年为30.6%)尚不确定。此外,由于勘探和建设生产基础设施所需的交货时间,即使在特朗普总统的第一任期结束之前,墨西哥湾的成功租赁也可能无法生产。

无论是从短期还是长期来看,支持石油和天然气行业投资增长,使它们有一个良好的发展潜力,不是针对具体能源做出具体的规定,而是要涉及到税法的变化。较低的企业税率可能导致美国油气开发步伐加快。由于100%的支出条款和废除企业替代最低税(有关美国税收减免和就业法的详细说明及其对能源行业的意义,请参阅Ernest&Young的报告),税后利润率也预计会增加。

但是,如果美国的贸易政策向着实行保护主义的方向发展,那么降低税率和减少石油和天然气行业监管的效果可能会减弱。即使潜在的能源危险无法影响到美国的石油和天然气出口市场,甚至在更深的交易市场和替代性能源市场上也无法掀起波澜,但重商主义的措施可能会通过材料成本上涨(例如钢材进口关税)影响美国石油和天然气工业,全球经济放缓贸易和经济增长是全球石油和天然气需求增长的基础。

当所有事情都考虑到了,目前政府推出的针对特定能源的政策并不是美国石油和天然气生产、公司利润或2017年投资增长的重要推动力。相反,市场力量和技术进步提高了钻井效率并降低了成本,以及奥巴马政府期间推出的石油和液化天然气出口政策都应该得到生产和出口的持续增长。

展望未来,2017年推出的许多政策将为美国石油和天然气产量的增长提供少量支持,但在另一方面,在长期扩大联邦租赁的情况下,它们也将受到其他因素的限制,包括国家政策,环境反对,以及增加利益相关方对环境责任方面的承诺。在美国,页岩革命将继续扩大非联邦土地的生产。石油和天然气市场状况将继续至关重要,包括实地因素(如钻井成本和压裂技术的改进),其他生产国(例如欧佩克,俄罗斯,委内瑞拉,墨西哥,伊朗)的行为,以及发展中国家(尤其是中国和印度)的经济和能源需求增长。

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