”一带一路”背景下中国和中亚地区贸易发展状况研究(Study on the Trade Development of China and Central Asia under the Background of “One Belt And One Road” )开题报告

1. 研究目的与意义（文献综述包含参考文献）

文 献 综 述

1.Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived. Although it is believed that BRI is a project aimed to strengthen and support worldwide trade, some analysts see the project as a disturbing expansion of Chinas economic and political power all around the world(Andrew Chatzky 2020). This research is going to mainly focus on what consequences might BRI have on Central Asias economic and political development.

1.2 Need for the study

Due to the hesitation of whether BRI is a risky plan for the rest of the countries or not this study explores the advantages and disadvantages of BRI. This thesis has different researches from worldwide publishments and studies. Therefore, studying the trade development of China and the rest of the world has a guiding role in exploring trade between China and Central Asia, and can provide a hint for the combination of theory and reference research.

2. Literature Review

2.1 The development of BRI

Ibold, Sebastian (2021) stated in his paper that BRI is a transcontinental long-term policy and investment program which aims at infrastructure development and acceleration of the economic integration of countries along the route of the historic Silk Road. The Initiative was unveiled in 2013 by China`s president Xi Jinping and until 2016, was known as OBOR One Belt One Road. On March 28, 2015, the official outline for the Belt and Road Initiative was issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the People`s Republic of China (PRC), with authorization of the State Council.

The BRI combines two initiatives:

The (land based) Silk Road Economic Belt, comprising six development corridors

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

The original Silk Road arose during the westward expansion of Chinas Han Dynasty (206 BCE220 CE), which forged trade networks throughout what are today the Central Asian countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as modern-day India and Pakistan to the south. Those routes extended more than four thousand miles to Europe. (Andrew Chatzky 2020)

According to Professor Wang Yaos research BRI investments in the first half of 2020 went into all sectors. Energy investments accounted for 37.6% of total investments, transport-related investments for about 30%. This is a continuation of a focus on infrastructure investments in the BRI.

Compared to the previous years, most sectors saw a decline in BRI investments in the first half of 2020. The strongest decline in BRI investments was in energy investments, which dropped from USD 19.7 billion in the first half of 2019 to USD 8.8 billion in the first half of 2020. Investments in metals increased slightly from USD 2.7 billion to USD 3.2 billion. Health-related investments, which could be seen as a part of the health-silk road, have declined in the first half of 2020 to USD 130 million, down from USD 160 million in the comparison period 2019.

2.2 China Central Asia: Present Future of Economic Relations

As Vladimir Paramonovs stated statistics follows, at the moment China occupies an extremely modest place in the foreign trade of the Central Asian states. China accounts for not more than 9% of their external trade, and the countries of Central Asia themselves are not of great importance to Chinas foreign trade. Their total share is not greater than 0.4% of the overall volume of Chinas foreign trade (Paramonov 2005)

Despite the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the USSR, Central Asia remains a core element in the security strategy of the Peoples Republic of China. This strategy, establishing a continuum between Chinas internal and external security, has evolved from a

strategy of influence following the independence of the new republics to a period of pragmatic adaptation to developments in the international arena after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) has emerged as the instrument for this flexible strategy of adaptation, of which the economic and energy dimension has now become key. (Niquet n.d.)

In order to maintain its tremendous economic growth, China has found it necessary to look beyond its borders. Central Asia is one such region, with its strategic location and natural resources. Ever since the five Central Asian republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan became independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China has been investing in these five countries, three of which (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) share borders with it. The pace of investment has accelerated since the turn of the century. Surpassing Russia as Central Asias biggest trading partner in 2009,

Chinas trade with the region soared from $700 million in 1998 to $25 billion in 2008, and doubled again in 2013 to $49 billion. (Tang n.d.)

Kley Eurasianet (2020) stated in the research that many of the projects are investments primarily funded by Chinese businesses with no obligation from Nur-Sultan. These include a new Chinese-Kazakh cement plantwith designed daily production of 2,500 tons of clinker cement, the Orda glass plant, and a new Yutong bus factory under constructionin Karaganda region. Manufacturing is now the backbone of Chinese economic engagement in Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, Nur-Sultan is paying off its loans. The following graph shows all Kazakh government and state-owned entities (SOE) debt to China. Government debt is dropping, while investment is increasing.

With Chinese financing, Uzbekistan is looking to turn itself into a manufacturing and hydrocarbon-processing powerhouse.

Tashkent does not publish disaggregated statistics on FDI flows or external borrowing

by country of origin. But the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade claimstotal FDI grew 3.2 times from $2.9 billion to $9.3 billion between 2018 and 2019, as the country opened up after the death of longtime President Islam Karimov.

Large-scale Chinese government lending to Tajikistan has dried up over the last five years. While Beijing has hit the brakes, Chinese firms have steadily increased investments (sometimes in the form of joint ventures) in mining, cement, textiles and agriculture. Unlike loans from Eximbank, the Tajik government does not have to pay these back. For joint ventures the Chinese partner will typically make the majority capital investment, with the Tajik side organizing land and regulatory approval. Often the Tajik government provides tax benefitsor free land for Chinese investments.

In Kyrgyzstan too, Chinese government-to-government lending is dropping here because of the Kyrgyz governments concerns about the debt burden. And as in Tajikistan, there has been a steady stream of Chinese private investments in the country for which the Kyrgyz government bears no responsibility.

China is one of the main creditors for all of Central Asias countries. How much do these countries owe to China and are they completely equal partners?

As in Egemberdiyeva Zhazgul(2019) stated in her paper, Nursultans official debt to China exceeds $12 billion. China will build more than 50 Chinese factories. Kyrgyzstan owes the most of all to Chinese banks: $1.7 billion. Chinese credits makes up 48% of Tajikstans debt. China is the major investor in Uzbekistans economy. So far, the republic has borrowed $7.8 billion in Beijing.

BRI is a risky plan for the rest of the countries. Ellis Sam (2018) in her study stated that China's Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious infrastructure project in modern history. It spans over 60 countries and will cost over a trillion dollars. The plan is to make it easier for the world to trade with China, by funding roads, railways, pipelines, and other infrastructure projects in Asia and Africa. China is loaning trillions of dollars to any country that's willing

to participate and it's been a big hit with the less democratic countries in the region. This makes the BRI a risky plan as well. But China is pushing forward because its goals are not strictly economic, they're also geopolitical. (Ellis 2018)

Project that has raised countrys debt levels shows pitfalls of using Beijing loans. The Montenegrin governments borrowing from China to finance the roads cost, estimated at 1.3bn, has sent the countrys debt soaring from 63 per cent of gross domestic product in 2012 to almost 80 per cent. If Montenegro were to default, the terms of its contract for the loans even give China the right to access Montenegrin land as collateral.(Hopkins 2019)

One Belt One Road Could Make Or Break This Poor European Country. The World Bank believes that the Chinese loan which Montenegro will pay back between 2020 and 2040 is a threat to Montenegros long-term financial stability. VICE News Tonight traveled to the highway to find out where exactly it's leading.(Vice news 2018)

References

2. 研究的基本内容、问题解决措施及方案

1. research topic

chinas belt and road initiative (bri), sometimes referred to as the new silk road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived. although it is believed that bri is a project aimed to strengthen and support worldwide trade, some analysts see the project as a disturbing expansion of chinas economic and political power all around the world(andrew chatzky 2020). this research is going to mainly focus on what consequences might bri have on central asias economic and political development.

in this study the author will mainly employ qualitative research, combination of the theory and facts.