BMP5
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
Contents
The fundamental requirements of BMP iv
Section 1 Introduction 1
Section 2 The threat 4
Section 3 Threat and risk assessment 6
Section 4 Planning 8
Section 5 Ship Protection Measures 11
Section 6 Reporting 21
Section 7 Ships under attack 23
Annex A Contact details 33
Annex B Maritime security charts 35
Annex C Common understanding 36
Annex D UKMTO reporting forms 38
Annex E Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms 40
Annex F Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing 47
Annex G Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts 49
Annex H Definitions and abbreviations 50
Annex I Supporting organisations 53
Annex J Voyage reference card 69
Section 1 Introduction
Seafarers have encountered different security threats when operating ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
The purpose of this publication is to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay and report attacks. Experience has shown application of the recommendations in this publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers.
Piracy-specific Best Management Practice (BMP), international navies and capacity building ashore have helped to suppress piracy. However, Somali piracy has not been eradicated and remains a threat.
The BMP contained in this publication mitigates the risk from piracy and other maritime security threats.
Regional instability has introduced other maritime security threats, which include:
bull; Deliberate targeting of ships by extremist groups.
bull; Collateral damage arising from regional conflict.
BMP piracy measures are effective, but differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of mitigation. For example, attacks carried out by extremists may be more determined, as they may be willing to risk their lives.
The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates have subjected hostages to violence and other ill treatment and periods of captivity for some hijacked seafarers have lasted for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships and endanger life.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (www.ukmto.org) and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (www.mschoa.org) websites should be consulted for advice.
See annex A for contact details.
This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC Circulars (see www.imo.org) and advice on the Maritime Security Transit Corridor.
Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Masterrsquo;s overriding authority and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo.
Geographical area
The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the Bab el Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary.
Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region. Threats are dynamic; information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A.
Voluntary Reporting Area
The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO.
MSCHOA vessel registration area
The MSCHOA vessel registration area is designed to inform military counter piracy forces of the transit of merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The MSCHOA vessel registration area is defined on maritime security chart Q6099.
High Risk Area
A High Risk Area (HRA) is an industry defined area within the VRA where it is considered that a higher risk of attack exists, and additional security requirements may be necessary. The HRA is outlined on maritime security chart Q6099. It is important the latest information on current threats is used when planning routes through the HRA. Ships should be prepared to deviate from their planned route at short notice to avoid threats highlighted by navigation warnings or by military forces.
Maritime Security Transit Corridor
The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on maritime security chart Q6099 and the figure below and consists of:
bull; The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
-- The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) but an established transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their counter piracy patrols. Within the IRTC, group transits and national convoys may be offered.
bull; The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands.
bull; A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS.
It is recommended that ships use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and surveillance.
Joint War Committee listed area
The insurance community may list an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloydrsquo;s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the JWC listed area can be found on their website: www.lmalloyds.com/lma/jointwar.
<p
剩余内容已隐藏,支付完成后下载完整资料</p
|
原文 |
翻译 |
|
BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea Contents The fundamental requirements of BMP V Section 1 Introduction 1 Section 2 The threat 4 Section 3 Threat and risk assessment 6 Section 4 Planning 8 Section 5 Ship Protection Measures 11 Section 6 Reporting 21 Section 7 Ships under attack 23 Annex A Contact details 33 Annex B Maritime security charts 35 Annex C Common understanding 36 Annex D UKMTO reporting forms 38 Annex E Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa reporting forms 40 Annex F Additional guidance for vessels engaged in fishing 47 Annex G Additional advice for leisure craft, including yachts 49 Annex H Definitions and abbreviations50 Annex I Supporting organisations 53 Annex J Voyage reference card 69 Section 1 Introduction Seafarers have encountered different security threats when operating ships in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. The purpose of this publication is to help ships plan their voyage and to detect, avoid, deter, delay and report attacks. Experience has shown application of the recommendations in this publication makes a significant difference to the safety of seafarers. Piracy-specific Best Management Practice (BMP), international navies and capacity building ashore have helped to suppress piracy. However, Somali piracy has not been eradicated and remains a threat. The BMP contained in this publication mitigates the risk from piracy and other maritime security threats. Regional instability has introduced other maritime security threats, which include: bull; Deliberate targeting of ships by extremist groups. bull; Collateral damage arising from regional conflict. BMP piracy measures are effective, but differences in attack methods from other threats may require other forms of mitigation. For example, attacks carried out by extremists may be more determined, as they may be willing to risk their lives. The consequences of not adopting effective security measures can be severe. Some pirates have subjected hostages to violence and other ill treatment and periods of captivity for some hijacked seafarers have lasted for several years. Other attacks have demonstrated an intent to damage ships and endanger life. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (www.ukmto.org) and Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (www.mschoa.org) websites should be consulted for advice. See annex A for contact details. This BMP complements piracy guidance in the latest International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC Circulars (see www.imo.org) and advice on the Maritime Security Transit Corridor. Nothing in this BMP detracts from the Masterrsquo;s overriding authority and responsibility to protect their crew, ship and cargo. Geographical area The geography of the region is diverse and ranges from narrow choke points such as the Bab el Mandeb (BAM) Straits and the Strait of Hormuz to the wide-open ocean of the Somali basin. Each area presents different challenges and threats will vary. Attacks on ships and seafarers have taken place throughout the region. Threats are dynamic; information should be sought from the organisations listed in annex A. Voluntary Reporting Area The UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is identified on maritime security charts such as UKHO Q6099. Ships entering and operating within the VRA are encouraged to register with the UKMTO. Registration establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO. MSCHOA vessel registration area The MSCHOA vessel registration area is designed to inform military counter piracy forces of the transit of merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The MSCHOA vessel registration area is defined on maritime security chart Q6099. High Risk Area A High Risk Area (HRA) is an industry defined area within the VRA where it is considered that a higher risk of attack exists, and additional security requirements may be necessary. The HRA is outlined on maritime security chart Q6099. It is important the latest information on current threats is used when planning routes through the HRA. Ships should be prepared to deviate from their planned route at short notice to avoid threats highlighted by navigation warnings or by military forces. Maritime Security Transit Corridor The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) is a military established corridor upon which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts. The MSTC is shown on maritime security chart Q6099 and the figure below and consists of: bull; The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). -- The IRTC is not a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) but an established transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden where naval forces focus their counter piracy patrols. Within the IRTC, group transits and national convoys may be offered. bull; The BAM TSS and the TSS West of the Hanish Islands. bull; A two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the BAM TSS. It is recommended that ships use the MSTC to benefit from the military presence and surveillance. Joint War Committee listed area The insurance community may list an area of perceived enhanced risk in the region. Ships entering the area would need to notify their insurers and additional insurance premiums may apply. The Joint War Committee (JWC) comprises underwriting representatives from both Lloydrsquo;s and the International Underwriting Association representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market. The geographic limits of the JWC listed area can be found on th 剩余内容已隐藏,支付完成后下载完整资料 资料编号:[240194],资料为PDF文档或Word文档,PDF文档可免费转换为Word |
您可能感兴趣的文章
- 饮用水微生物群:一个全面的时空研究,以监测巴黎供水系统的水质外文翻译资料
- 步进电机控制和摩擦模型对复杂机械系统精确定位的影响外文翻译资料
- 具有温湿度控制的开式阴极PEM燃料电池性能的提升外文翻译资料
- 警报定时系统对驾驶员行为的影响:调查驾驶员信任的差异以及根据警报定时对警报的响应外文翻译资料
- 门禁系统的零知识认证解决方案外文翻译资料
- 车辆废气及室外环境中悬浮微粒中有机磷的含量—-个案研究外文翻译资料
- ZigBee协议对城市风力涡轮机的无线监控: 支持应用软件和传感器模块外文翻译资料
- ZigBee系统在医疗保健中提供位置信息和传感器数据传输的方案外文翻译资料
- 基于PLC的模糊控制器在污水处理系统中的应用外文翻译资料
- 光伏并联最大功率点跟踪系统独立应用程序外文翻译资料
