里根经济学

原文作者 Olivier Jean Blanchard 单位Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

摘要： 1980年里根总统就任后，通过减免税收和减少政府的财政支出的手段，致力于解决经济衰退和大幅通胀两大难题，该计划突出了供给管理在经济增长中的重要作用。里根总统为代表的政府主张的减税政策促使了美国的经济得到复苏，但也不能忽视高额赤字所带来的问题。

关键词：里根经济学； 供给侧改革； 减税；赤字

0 概要

里根总统入主白宫，向公众承诺将会对保守的经济政策做出重大变革。他的计划包括发动供给侧革命，减少铺张浪费的政府活动，降低税收以及减少对市场经济的干扰。对此，人们预期美国的经济效率将更高，经济增长将更快，通胀率也将降至最低。减税会使预算很快恢复平衡，财政扩张也确实降低了失业率，但政府很快发现减税也导致了贸易和预算赤字。尽管早期的梦想仍未实现，但里根时代代表了美国制定经济政策的转折点。通货膨胀大大降低，紧缩货币政策的公信力也得到了增强。更重要的是，有迹象表明里根已经赢得了他的政治赌注：早期的减税产生了预算赤字，这施加了扭转政府开支上升趋势和改变其构成所需的压力。

关于供给侧政策的表现还未有确切定论。两大税制改革极大地改变了这一格局。投资行业成功规避了紧缩的反通货膨胀货币政策的影响，许多扭曲性税收现象也有所减少。然而，到目前为止，几乎没有证据能够表明私人储蓄有所增加，也没有证据表明生产力得到提高。

就债务方面而言，美国现在面临着更大的公共债务，而且已成为世界其他国家的债务国。当前必须采取纠正措施，部分措施现已在实施阶段。实施这些措施需要付出一定代价但尚在能接受范围。尽管有种种缺点，里根经济学还是取得了比欧洲大多数保守主义政策更多的成就。

1 介绍

在经济增长率低、通货膨胀严重以及卡特萎靡政策风行的国家形势下，里根开始执政，承诺会进行供给侧革命，通过更低的通货膨胀、更低的税收以及更小规模的政府来促进生产力的增长。根据拉弗曲线计算，减税将增加产值并平衡预算。

但是美梦没有持续多久。逐渐人们发现，减税不会减少政府开支，也不会不平衡预算带来供给侧繁荣。恰恰相反，减税会导致财政赤字。因此，政府迅速变更了策略。这项政策的核心始终是一场政治的豪赌，赌的是减税将导致赤字从而施加政府削减开支的压力。正是这种押注，使里根的保守战略有别于欧洲各国的保守政策以及他们的财政紧缩战略。减税引发了赤字，其供求作用决定了经济复苏的力度和型态，且将在未来很长一段时间内持续影响。这些措施如果取得成功，将会实现低税收、低开支。而无论成功与否，税收结构都将得到永久性的改良，同时也会带来更高的内债和外债。这一切是否值得呢？这就是本文试图回答的问题。

这一政策是在1981-83年间启动的。继卡特执政时期启动货币紧缩政策之后，1981年到1983年间又进行了大规模的减税，造成了过去六年始终保持着货币紧缩和财政扩张共存的局面。从1981年到1985年，随着通货膨胀率的下降和赤字的增加，经济相继经历了衰退和持续增长。1985年，削减必要开支的进程被初步落实。1986年，通过税制改革修改并巩固了减税政策，至今沿用。削减开支的速度能达到何种程度现在仍不确定。第一节对这些政策进行了真实论述，为论文其余部分的分析奠定了基础。

第2节研究了1981年以来政策对宏观经济的影响。本文首先讨论了最初的反通货膨胀。接着揭示了减税和赤字在塑造后续经济复苏型态中所起的作用。最后，本文大胆推测了如果政府采取无赤字战略，将会发生什么结果。有证据表明，若要实现长期经济复苏，减税和赤字起着非常重要的作用。本文其余部分将探讨该政策对未来的影响。

第3节则对这一政治赌注的可能结果做出了评估。结论是：即使目前看来，未来的赤字减少需要增税和削减开支，政府开支的规模和构成也会受到里根政策的影响。然而，与战后社会福利计划的建立相比，这些影响的重要性却微不足道。无论如何，这都表明了利用保守政策改变政府在经济中的作用定位存在严格限制。

第4节研究了赤字和债务潜在的中长期影响。得出的结论是：几乎没有理由相信债务积累最终会是灾难性的。但是债务，无论是内债还是外债，都要付出代价。美国财政赤字减少已经导致并将持续导致世界储蓄、资本积累和未来产出减少。这不仅给美国，同样也给世界其他国家带来了负担。内债越高，意味着将来的税收越高，扭曲性越高。最后，诱发形成的的美国贸易逆差导致财富转移，必须通过贸易顺差和实际美元贬值来逆转形势或通过永久融资来解决。这些代价都是难以量化的。粗略计算一下，这些代价虽然算不上很大，但也不是无关紧要。

第5节回到最初战略的重点即供给侧影响。迄今为止，由于资本积累的高利率税盾作用，受到影响最明显的是投资行业。1981年的投资激励措施在很大程度上被1986年的税改废了。供给侧的其他影响难以探究，其难度甚至比许多怀疑论者所预期的更甚。尽管政府提高了实际利率，增加了税收激励，甚至不惜赤字，但私人储蓄并未增加。而且在这个阶段，几乎没有确切证据表明当前生产力有繁荣迹象或即将出现繁荣迹象。

结论部分简要总结了调查结果。一个人判断该政策成功与否最终取决于他自己的价值观。这项政策并没有导致供给侧激增，各方对此结果都表示欢欣。但它完成了保守党议程上的两项主要内容，即降低了通货膨胀并重新定义了政府的作用。而且这样做并没有对经济造成重大破坏，这在欧洲是无与伦比的壮举。

2 货币和财政政策

里根执政的头两年在很大程度上为接下来的行动奠定了基础。卡特执政期间，货币通货紧缩已开始实施，而里根要做的是赋予它更多的公信力。财政政策发生的剧烈变化完全是政府一力促成。减税法案于1981年通过，并在接下来的三年中逐步实施。随着时间的推移，激增出越来越大的财政赤字。银根紧缩政策和日益扩张的财政政策首先导致了经济衰退和通货紧缩，然后才实现了持续扩张。这种紧货币-宽财政并存局面一直持续到到1985-86年。当时，由于巨额赤字带来的政治压力越来越大，各方不得不开始遵循新的预算博弈规则并且各方同意试行开支削减计划。同时，税制改革完成了最终修改和巩固。

3 政策和宏观经济：1981-86

我要强调两个问题。第一个问题是通货紧缩的成本，另一个问题是赤字对经济复苏的贡献。

从1981年到1986年，美国经济经历了三个阶段。第一阶段特点是货币紧缩，第二阶段是财政扩张。而过去这几年最大的特点则是货币政策和财政政策组合带来令人期待的变化。直到1982年，宏观经济都一直受到货币政策的影响。赤字仍然不大，主要任务是实现短期实际利率的上升。一旦金融市场认为美联储致力于反通胀，从而在一段时间内保持高实际利率，那么长期实际利率也会上升。对收益率曲线的研究表明，这种情况发生在1981年中期。由于对赤字金额期待过高导致预期实际利率过高，而要将实际利率与公信力完全区分开并非易事。所以就准确的时间点这方面仍有争议。

在20世纪80年代早期，一个备受争议的问题是：如果反通货膨胀更加可信，就牺牲率而言，反通货膨胀的成本是否会更低？毫无疑问，在政府的支持下，尽管美联储未能遵守目标区间，但其反通货膨胀的承诺在1981年底已经变得具有公信力。是公信力降低了牺牲率吗？

为了回答这个问题，笔者在这段时间内特别研究了菲利普斯曲线。很明显，货币紧缩在一定程度上提高了利率，使得美元大幅升值，从而导致进口商品的相对价格下降，且通货膨胀的下降速度也比之前快得多。Buiter和Miller（1983）已经在对撒切尔反通货膨胀的分析中强调了这一效应。笔者相当严格地遵守了菲利普斯曲线的标准规范，将季度工资通胀，前期观察的价格通胀，前期的“预期”通胀与男性失业率都联系在一起进行研究。预期通胀通过当前和过去通胀的几何分布滞后来表现，衰减系数为每季度15%。

反通货膨胀的代价比预期的要低。经济复苏的势头虽然不如预期强劲，但必须部分归功于财政扩张。除了支出超过产出之外，经济复苏型态与以前没有太大不同。特别值得一提的是，投资产业并没有受到货币财政混合结构的影响。

4 赤字遗产

美国经济现在已趋近于充分就业，但财政和贸易赤字仍然很高。这对近期和未来都有影响。在不久的将来，经济将面临如何实现在保持充分就业的同时减少双重赤字的过渡问题。到时，赤字的影响不会消失。而美国高额的内债和外债将继续对美国以及世界上其他国家造成影响。

5 供给侧影响

里根计划的最终目标是解放供给侧的力量。在短期发展和赤字对资本积累的不利影响背后，人们能否辨别出储蓄、劳动力供应、投资和生产力增长变化的迹象并加以应对呢？最后一节将回顾已经发生的情况以及可能出现的势。在评估未来的时候，我们应该考虑到这样一个事实：为了平衡预算，最终可能必须提高税收。我不知道这种增加税收的方式将会是什么，在此我只能暂时忽略这个问题。然而，这个问题关系重大。

6 结论

里根的保守政策及其赤字战略促成了20世纪80年代的宏观经济事件。然而，当一切尘埃落定时，与一系列措施的强度相比，这一政策的效果持久性并不那么尽如人意：通货膨胀将会降低，政府的作用将受到质疑并在一定程度上被重新定义，政府非利息支出最终将比没有这项政策时低几个百分点。但是，由于债务增加需要支付更多利息，非利息支出的相对减少不会转化为整体支出或税收的减少。

赤字战略导致经济在20世纪80年代稳定复苏。但从长远来看，其代价是世界资本积累的减少和美国外债的增加。尽管通胀率较低、政府干预少、扭曲性税收少，但几乎没有迹象表明，20世纪90年代会是供应侧复苏的十年。

因此，结果就是并没有出现供给侧激增，同样也未得到广泛的支持。至于人们究竟如何评价这一结果？是大动干戈但收效甚微的徒劳？还是为了重新定义政府作用并且维持高就业率和稳定经济增长的一次成功尝试？这最终还是要取决于人们自己的价值观。与欧洲的保守政策相比，这个结果看起来确实不错。同时这个结果也提出了两个问题。由于这两个问题在本文中都已经从不同角度进行了详细论述，我仅再简单谈谈几点看法。

里根的紧货币-宽财政组合策略能够发挥作用是否因为它只在美国施行？换言之，美国的经济表现是否意味着相应的欧洲经济的长期衰退？对这一论点几乎没有论据支持。根据我们对各国政策传导机制的了解，在欧洲财政和货币政策不变的情况下，美国混合策略的净效应可能并不会引起经济萎缩；即使会，这种经济萎缩也可能被欧洲政策的组合变化所抵消：如果是这样，那么美国的经济复苏势头将更强劲，而不是更弱。同时，值得注意的是：美国反通货膨胀导致了债务危机，但同时增加了实际利率，减少了对欠发达国家出口的需求，并将贸易条件变得不利于欠发达国家。这一点无疑也是需要被纳入考虑范围的反通货膨胀的代价。但毫无疑问，债务国表现不佳也是美国经济表现的镜像。

外文文献出处：Economic Policy October 1987 Printed in Great Britain

附外文文献原文

0 Summary

President Reagan came to the White House promising a major shift to conservative economic policies. His program included a supply- side revolution, a scaling down of wasteful government activity, lower taxes and less interference with the market economy. As a result, it was expected, the US economy would become more efficient, with faster growth and minimal inflation. Tax reductions would pay for themselves so that the budget would soon return to balance. Fiscal expansion did help bring down unemployment, but the administration soon learned that tax cuts led to trade and budget deficits. Though early dreams remain unfulfilled, the Reagan period represents a turning point in US economic policy making. Inflation has been much reduced, and the credibility of tight monetary policy enhanced. More importantly, there are signs that Reagan has won his political bet: early tax cuts generated budget deficits which exerted the pressure required to turn the tide of rising government spending and change its composition.

The verdict on supply-side policies is not yet clear. Two major tax reforms have profoundly modified th

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0 Summary

President Reagan came to the White House promising a major shift to conservative economic policies. His program included a supply- side revolution, a scaling down of wasteful government activity, lower taxes and less interference with the market economy. As a result, it was expected, the US economy would become more efficient, with faster growth and minimal inflation. Tax reductions would pay for themselves so that the budget would soon return to balance. Fiscal expansion did help bring down unemployment, but the administration soon learned that tax cuts led to trade and budget deficits. Though early dreams remain unfulfilled, the Reagan period represents a turning point in US economic policy making. Inflation has been much reduced, and the credibility of tight monetary policy enhanced. More importantly, there are signs that Reagan has won his political bet: early tax cuts generated budget deficits which exerted the pressure required to turn the tide of rising government spending and change its composition.

The verdict on supply-side policies is not yet clear. Two major tax reforms have profoundly modified the landscape. Investment has been shielded from the effects of a tight anti-inflationary monetary policy and many distortions have been reduced. So far, however, there is little evidence either of any increase in private savings or of a boost to productivity.

On the liability side, the US now faces a larger public debt and has become indebted to the rest of the world. Corrective actions will have to be taken, and some are already under way. They will have significant but not dramatic costs. With all its shortcomings, Reaganomics has achieved more than most conservative policies in Europe.

1 Introduction

In a country suffering from low growth, inflation and the Carter malaise, the Reagan administration began with promises of a supply-side revolution. Lower inflation, lower taxes and a smaller government were going to boost productivity and growth. Thanks to the Laffer curve, cuts in taxes were going to generate increased revenues and help balance the budget.

The dreams did not last long. As it became clear that tax cuts would lead to deficits rather than to cuts in spending or a balanced budget supply-side boom, the strategy was abruptly changed. The centrepiece of the policy became and has remained a political bet, the bet that cuts in taxes would create, via deficits, the political pressure to reduce government spending. It is this bet which, more than anything else, distinguishes the Reagan conservative strategy from its European counterparts and their strategy of fiscal austerity. Tax-cut induced deficits, with their supply and demand-side effects have determined the strength and the shape of the recovery; and they will affect the future for a long time. If successful, they will lead to lower taxation and lower spending. Successful or unsuccessful, they will have permanently modified the structure of taxation and will leave a legacy of higher internal and external debt. Was it all worth it? That is the question that this paper attempts to answer.

The dynamics of policy were set in motion during 1981-83. The monetary contraction started under Carter was followed by large tax cuts from 1981 to 1983, leading to the tight-money loose-fiscal mix which has characterized the last six years. From 1981 to 1985, as inflation decreased and deficits mounted, the economy went successively through a recession and a sustained expansion. In 1985, a process to achieve the required spending cuts was put in place tentatively, and in 1986 tax cuts were consolidated and modified through a tax reform that is now being implemented. The speed at which spending cuts will be achieved is still highly uncertain. Section 1 gives a factual account of those policies, setting the stage for the analysis of the rest of the paper.

Section 2 studies the effects of policy on the macroeconomy since 1981. It first looks at the initial disinflation. It then shows the role of tax cuts and deficits in shaping the subsequent recovery. Finally, it speculates as to what would have happened had the administration followed a no-deficit strategy. The evidence suggests that tax cuts and deficits deserve a good part of the credit for the prolonged recovery. The rest of the paper looks at the implications of the policy for the future.

Section 3 assesses the likely outcome of the political bet. It concludes that even if, as now seems likely, future deficit reductions come both from tax increases and spending cuts, the size and composition of government spending will have been affected by Reagan policies. Those effects however pale in significance when compared to the build-up in social entitlement programs of the post-war period. They show the stringent limits faced by conservative policies, for better or for worse, in changing the role of government in the economy.

Section 4 examines the potential medium and long-run effects of deficits and debt. It concludes that there is little justification for the belief that debt accumulation will eventually prove disastrous. But debts, both internal and external, carry a cost. US fiscal deficits have reduced and will reduce world saving, capital accumulation and future output, and have imposed a burden not only on the US but also on the rest of the world. Higher internal debt also implies higher taxation and larger distortions in the future. Finally, induced US trade deficits have led to a transfer of wealth, which must be either reversed or permanently financed, through a trade surplus and real dollar depreciation. Those costs are hard to quantify; back-of-the-envelope computations suggest that they are neither very large nor insignificant.

Section 5 returns to the supply-side effects which were the focus of the initial strategy. To date the most obvious effects are those on investment, through the tax-shieldi

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